something grim emerges when one tries to work with a eudaimonistic moral theory while examining oppression, for one centers the importance of flourishing and then confronts the terrible fact of its distortions or absence under conditions of oppression. . . . The moral trouble appears in two forms. The first . . . is that the self under oppression can be morally damaged . . . The second [is that some virtues under these conditions are] disjoined from their bearer's own flourishing. (4) Aristotle knew this disjunction could exist occasionally; courage is the obvious example. But he did not consider the possibility that a separation between eudaimonia and virtue could be common, Tessman says, because he theorized from and for those in a privileged position. Nevertheless, he recognized that virtue is only necessary for a good life, not sufficient, leaving conceptual space for lives systematically incapable of eudaimonia.
Tessman's first three chapters analyze moral damage to the self. Her discussion resists two opposing errors: on the one hand, identifying the victims of oppression as the problem, because of their damaged selves; on the other hand, elevating the vices of those who have been damaged into virtues. in the second half of the book, she examines virtues that under oppression are virtues, but which compromise rather than promote their bearer's flourishing.
Chapter 1 is called, poignantly, "Regretting the self one is." oppression interferes with a full life not only by limiting resources like power, respect, and money but also by fostering habits and desires that deform one's own choices. Developing Bernard williams's concept of moral luck, Tessman distinguishes incident luck-specific actions one might take-from constitutive luck, that is, the person one has become. she also distinguishes systemic luck (the result of a social system, humanly created) from natural or accidental luck. Changing the self created and damaged in this way, let alone changing the society, will be difficult or impossible. Tessman wants an ethical theory that is of use within such situations that encourages attempts to change them but does not assume that success is possible. The virtues she describes, and prescribes, are complex, and include, for instance, not only anger at what has been done and resistance to it but also regret at the necessity of inflicting pain on others. on the one hand, both anger and regret are burdensome, obstacles on the path to a full human life. on the other hand, another virtue required under oppressionself-understanding: "This really is the best i could do"-is liberating, both for the person released from undue guilt and for the community freed to accept each in her limitations. in a culture whose moral theory focuses so much on duty and obligation, it is important to be able to separate assessment of harm from responsibility for that harm.
Chapter 2, "The Damage of Moral Damage," extends the analysis of the first chapter, tracing the ways in which images of "damaged" African Americans have been used to oppress them. speaking of moral injury is dangerous because of that history, yet what makes it dangerous also makes it important: today only conservatives talk about character. Those on the Left, Tessman argues, must recognize that criticizing institutions does not rule out evaluating character. on the contrary, the two projects inform one another: character traits usually seen as deficiencies may, in a context identified as oppressive, be recognized as virtues if they contribute to resistance; conversely, character traits that appear to be virtues should sometimes be seen as vices, because they uphold such institutions.
in chapter 3, "The ordinary vices of Domination," Tessman argues that oppressors are themselves damaged by their role. she focuses not on monsters but on ordinary people, who passively, but culpably, accept their status in an unjust hierarchy. "Callousness, greed, self-centeredness, dishonesty, cowardice, [and] injustice" are common vices in such people, and the absence of certain virtues is equally common: "compassion, generosity, co-operativeness, [and] openness to appreciating others" (55). Like the damaged victims of oppression, those who come to understand that privilege has harmed them morally may nevertheless be unable to change. Tessman argues against the easy assumption that moral damage to oppressors concerns other-regarding traits, and damage to the oppressed self-regarding traits. on the contrary, the wealthy can fail in a virtue such as hard work or men may fail to have a full emotional life-both self-regarding traits. similarly, the powerless can become vengeful; women may become manipulative. Finally, she challenges the distinction itself. "otherregarding virtues" also promote the good of their bearers: as Aristotle knew, human beings, deeply social, need a certain kind of polis in which to flourish, a kind of polis that requires "other-regarding" virtues of everyone.
in chapter 4, "Between indifference and Anguish," Tessman begins her discussion of virtues that burden (rather than damage) their possessors. Faced with enormous suffering in the world, one is forced to choose where to help, where even to pay attention. Although Aristotle found most virtue to lie in a mean between excess and deficiency, Tessman can find no adequate middle way; whatever one does, one is ignoring too much. But to do more would demand sacrificing other morally important dimensions of one's life-family, work, and friendship. The result of the insoluble conflict, she finds, is a life weighed down with regret and sorrow. To be virtuous, in other words, is to experience pain. Although Aristotle argued that virtue brings with it joy, and his commentators have identified that joy as the recognition of having done right, Tessman believes that the only joy associated with this virtue is found not in the disposition itself but in what one does to maintain a healthy life in the midst of suffering. Here she cites Chris Cuomo, who describes herself as moving from an immersion in political resistance to a life that includes a complementary search for fullness. Tessman also finds the virtue of sensitivity-and its near neighbors, pity in Aristotle and compassion in Martha Nussbaum-politically unreliable, for each involves a sense that such things might happen to oneself, a realization that shifts attention unstably between oneself and others. Nevertheless, their "absence is immeasurably worse" (106).
Chapter 5 examines the burdens that accompany virtuous political resistance. Those who exercise it may at times commit acts-from dishonesty to violence-that in a just society would be wrong. They may also need to acquire traits that are otherwise undesirable, such as anger and distrust. some resistant groups, of course, reject tactics they find inconsistent with their ideals; the nonviolence of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther king, Jr., are examples of this. But Tessman is a realist, and leaves open the possibility that less savory actions, as well as traits, may be necessary. Chosen, or accepted, in the name of eudaimonia for the many, they nevertheless do not constitute it in the resister. in particular, Tessman examines anger and its costs, courage and its risks, and the moral risks inherent in loyalty.
This last is the subject of her final substantive chapter, "Dangerous Loyalties." it is reasonably easy to recommend betrayal, rather than loyalty, "with respect to identities built on domination." in some sense, for instance, whites should be "race traitors." The issue becomes more complex for group loyalties built on resistance. Tessman's first point is that loyalty is not only compatible with criticism but often also requires it. only when criticism calls into question the group's very existence does loyalty disappear. in those situations, disloyalty does not become a virtue; rather, loyalty simply cannot be exercised. As Aristotle knew, "one cannot have perfect virtue . . . in a corrupt polis" (157).
in her concluding chapter, Tessman distinguishes four classes of traits that are in some sense admirable. First is virtue classically understood; second, virtue that carries with it a cost; third, a trait that is helpful against oppression but would not otherwise be desirable; and last, a trait that simply helps the oppressed survive. each category, she says, can contain traits rightly called virtues. Finally, the author asks whether eudaimonism, a theory of virtue with human flourishing at its center, is useful for lives that are oppressively limited. Her answer is affirmative; an "affirmation and embrace of life" persists, "perhaps amazingly," and makes eudaimonism relevant and fruitful.
Burdened Virtues is a courageous and useful work: courageous for its refusal simply to endorse the various traits that arise within communities of resistance, useful for its careful examination of Aristotle and its productive use of contemporary feminist and virtue literature. The density of Tessman's analysis and the philosophical habit of frequent reiteration, however, make the book a challenging read. occasionally, i found it claustrophobic: while oppression is ubiquitous, there are nevertheless other, many other, significant sources of burden and suffering. Disease, natural disasters, spiritual desolation, rejection, failure, loneliness, and loss-all these are built into the human condition. Perhaps in future work Tessman will specify the suffering particular to oppression, and extrapolate (or modify) her results in light of other sorts. i would also like to see her consider the Buddhist tradition, built upon recognizing the suffering intrinsic to human lives and offering concepts of compassion and equanimity in the face of it.
All in all, however, this is an important book, careful and scholarly; a significant contribution to the philosophical literature on virtue.
